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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//2A-9/19/84 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF CHILI, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2788 
FRANK MOBILIO. et al.. 
Petitioner, 
-and-
LOCAL 3179. AFSCME. 
Intervenor. 
FRANK MOBILIO, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The petition herein, which was filed by Frank Mobilio on 
his own behalf and on behalf of other employees of the Town of 
Chili, seeks to decertify Local 3179, AFSCME as the negotiating 
representative of a unit of employees of the Town. The 
petition does not seek certification of any other employee 
organization and is not filed on behalf of any such 
organization. Its purpose is only the decertification of the 
intervenor. It is supported by a sufficient showing of 
interest, but there is no declaration of the authenticity of 
the showing of interest as is required by §201.4(d) of our 
Rules of Procedure. The Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) therefore dismissed 
Board - C-2788 -2 
the petition, and the matter comes to us on Mobilio's 
exceptions to the Director's decision. 
We conclude that the Director's decision should be 
reversed because Rule 201.4(d) is ambiguous, and Mobilio might 
reasonably not have known that a declaration of authenticity 
was required herein. Rule 201.4(d) provides, inter alia, that 
the declaration must indicate "the name of the officer or agent 
executing the declaration, his position with the employee 
organization and a statement of his authority to execute the 
declaration on its behalf." This language might be read to 
indicate that a declaration of authenticity is required only 
where a petition is filed on behalf of an employees 
organization. Such an interpretation of the Rule would of 
course undermine its purpose, which:is to prevent an abuse of 
our processes by whatever organization or individual that 
submits a showing of interest. Nevertheless, Mobilio might 
have been misled into thinking that the declaration of 
authenticity was inapplicable to his petition.— 
Accordingly, while we affirm the proposition that a 
declaration of authenticity is required of an individual 
petitioner as well as of an employee organization, we excuse 
Mobilio's failure to file a declaration simultaneously with his 
petition as required by §201.4(d) of our Rules of Procedure. 
i/we shall consider a revision of our Rules of Procedure 
to make them more clear in this regard. 
09 
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We therefore give Mobilio ten (10) working days from his 
receipt of this decision to submit a declaration of 
2/ 
authenticity in conformity with §201.4(d) of our Rules.— 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that, if the declaration of 
authenticity is timely submitted, the 
matter be remanded to the Director for 
further proceedings; if it is not timely 
submitted, the petition be dismissed. 
DATED: September 18, 1984 
Albany, New York 
^/Compare, Town of Amherst. 13 PERB 1f3074 (1980). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In t h e M a t t e r of //2B-9/19/84 
JEFFERSONVILLE-YOUNGSVILLE FACULTY 
ASSOCIATION. 
CASE NO. D-0237 
upon the Charge of Violation of §210.1 
of the Civil Service Law 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On July 9. 1984, Martin L. Barr. Counsel to this Board, 
filed a charge alleging that the Jeffersonville-Youngsville 
Faculty Association (respondent) had violated Civil Service 
Law (CSL) §210.1 in that it caused, instigated, encouraged, 
condoned and engaged in a 15-day strike against the 
Jeffersonville-Youngsville Central School District (District) 
between April 30 and May 18. 1984. The charge further 
alleged that as many as 55 teachers in a negotiating unit of 
59 participated in the strike. 
The respondent proposed to forego the filing of an 
answer, and to thereby admit the factual allegations of the 
charge, upon the undertanding that Counsel would recommend, 
and this Board would acept, a penalty of loss of the 
respondent's right to have dues and agency shop fees deducted 
Board - D-0237 -2 
for a period of one year.— 
On the basis of the unanswered charge, we find that the 
respondent violated CSL §210.1 in that it engaged in a strike 
as charged, and we determine that the recommended penalty is 
a reasonable one and will effectuate the policies of the 
Act.-7 
NOW THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the deduction rights which 
are afforded the Jeffersonville-
Youngsville Faculty Association under 
CSL §208 be suspended commencing on the 
first practicable date and continuing 
for a period of one year. Thereafter, 
no dues or agency shop fees shall be 
deducted on its behalf by the 
Jeffersonville-Youngsvilie Central 
School District until the respondent 
affirms that it no longer asserts the 
right to strike against any 
i^In the event that the District makes deductions on 
behalf of the respondent over a period of less than 12 
months, the recommended penalty is intended to suspend the 
deduction of 100% of the annual dues and agency shop fees. 
—^The District has filed an objection to the proposed 
settlement. We note only in response to that objection 
that the proposed settlement is entirely consistent with 
Board disposition in previous cases involving strikes of 
equal or greater duration. Eastchester Teachers Assn., 
9 PERB 1P077 (1976); Orchard Park Teachers Assn.. 
8 PERB 1f3089 (1975); Yorktown Congress of Teachers. 
7 PERB 1f3001 (1974) . 
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government, as required by the 
provisions of CSL §210.3(g). 
DATED: September 19, 1984 
Albany, New York 
'*Z3£j2,& \jui. '&u.?-*t 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
~J3 \_/rV 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT^ RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of //2C-9/19/84 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. INC. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7449 
THOMAS C. BARRY. 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, INC. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-74 82 
THOMAS C. BARRY. 
Charging Party. 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ. (IVOR MOSKOWITZ. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
THOMAS C. BARRY, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These matters came to us in June 1984 on the exceptions 
of Thomas C. Barry to decisions of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
his charges, both of which allege that the United University 
Professions. Inc. (UUP) violated the Taylor Law by using part 
of his agency shop fee payments in the support of activities 
of a political nature. The Director relied upon our prior 
approval of UUP's refund procedure which allows it to use 
vr 9288 
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agency shop fee monies in support of political objectives so 
long as an objecting employee's money is refunded to him 
thereafter. UUP (Eson). 11 PERB 1P074 (1981). and dismissed 
the charges. 
Barry argued that, notwithstanding our decision in UUP 
(Eson). it is illegal for UUP to use his money for a 
political purpose even temporarily. In support of this 
proposition, he cited the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway. Airline and Steamship 
Clerks. U.S. , 17 PERB 1f7511 (1984), which holds, 
inter alia, that a "pure rebate approach is inadequate." 
Such a procedure is one that allows a union to collect agency 
shop fees and spend that money for all purposes including 
political and ideological causes, subject to a subsequent 
refund. 
In the light of this language, it was necessary that we 
reexamine the correctness of our interpretation of §208.3 of 
the Taylor Law in UUP (Eson) as sanctioning UUP's refund 
procedure. We further examined what alternative procedures 
would satisfy the statute, if UUP (Eson) was not correct, and 
what should be done about UUP's current agency shop fee 
procedure. Accordingly, we consolidated the two cases and 
invited Barry and UUP to submit- memoranda of law concerning 
these questions. Both have done so, UUP's addressing the 
merits of the charges and denying any violation of the Taylor 
- 9289 
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Law. UUP has also submitted a revised agency shop fee and 
refund procedure. 
Having considered these memoranda.— we conclude that 
our decision in UUP (Eson) should be overruled. It 
sanctioned a pure rebate procedure such as was rejected by 
2/ the U.S. Supreme Court in Ellis.— And as we said in UUP 
(Eson)-7: 
the refund requirement was intended to limit 
the agency shop fee provision to the extent 
necessary to satisfy the prerequisite for 
constitutionality announced by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
Following Abood, Ellis is the most recent examination 
^ of the question by the Supreme Court. It permits an agency 
shop fee where the union has adopted a procedure involving a 
precise advance reduction of the fee which assures that the 
union will not compel an objecting nonmember to lend it 
money that will be spent on political or ideologocial 
causes. Alternatively, an agency shop fee would be 
sanctioned where the union places the monies so collected in 
an interest-bearing escrow account and it makes an 
A/We have also considered a memorandum amicus curiae 
from the Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation. 
£/see also Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union. 
F2d (7th Circ. Sept. 6. 1984) which underscores the 
constitutional basis of the Ellis decision. 
•3/Supra, at p. 3106. 
Board - U-7449/U-7482 
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appropriate refund from that account before taking possession 
of its share of the money. By its terms, §208.3 of the 
Taylor Law can only be satisfied by a refund procedure.— 
Accordingly, as a refund procedure can be valid only if the 
agency shop fee is held in an escrow account, we understand 
§208.3 as sanctioning an agency shop fee only when such a 
procedure exists. 
As we have noted, UUP has submitted a revised agency 
shop fee/refund procedure which, it asserts, satisfies 
5/ Ellis.— This revised procedure does not utilize an 
l/section 208.3 of the Taylor Law permits an employee 
organization to receive an agency shop fee if it "has 
established and maintained a procedure providing for the 
refund to any employee demanding the return any part of an 
agency shop fee deduction which represents the employee's 
pro rata share of expenditures by the organization in aid 
of activities or causes of a political or ideological 
nature only incidentally related to terms and conditions of 
employment." 
ii/The revised procedure provides in pertinent part: 
Thereafter the agency fee shall be reduced in 
accordance with such objections by the 
approximate proportion of the agency fees spent 
by the union for such purposes, based on the 
latest fiscal year for which there is a 
completed and available audit. After the end 
of the fiscal year, and after the audit of the 
books is completed, the union shall determine 
the approximate proportion of agency fees 
actually spent by the union for such purposes 
during the fiscal year. After such final 
rebate determination is made an adjustment, if 
necessary, will be made in the refund amount. 
Objectors will be required to refund to the 
union any excess they may have received. 
>- 929T 
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escrow account and is a less than precise advance reduction 
system. Accordingly, for the reasons we have stated herein, 
we find it inadeguate under §208.3 of the Taylor Law. 
To satisfy both Ellis and the Taylor Law, we find that 
UUP must deposit 100% of all the agency shop fees of 
nonmembers who object to the use of their agency shop fees 
for political or ideological causes by demanding a refund, in 
an interest-bearing escrow account maintained in an 
institution regulated by the Banking Department of this 
State. This, of course, reguires UUP to give all nonmembers 
an opportunity to make such a demand before it commingles 
their agency shop fees with its members' dues. 
After making its calculation of the amount of the 
refund, with interest, and issuing payments to the nonmembers 
who had demanded it. UUP must wait until the time to appeal 
the amount of the refund has passed before it may take any 
money from the escrow account. Then, it may take the monies 
attributable to the nonmembers who had initially filed a 
demand but who have not appealed. The same practice shall be 
followed with respect to all the internal appellate steps. 
UUP may liquidate the escrow account upon the completion of 
its internal appellate steps so long as the final step 
involves a decision by a neutral, as contemplated by Abood. 
Absent such a final step. UUP may not take possession of the 
agency shop fee payments of those nonmembers who file a court 
claim until a judicial determination has been rendered. 
Board - U-7449/U-7482 -6 
Barry argues that the use of such a "neutral" should not 
be permitted as it is inherently unfair, the "neutral" being 
appointed by and beholden to UUP. This argument was 
considered by the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio, and rejected in Tierney v. City of 
Toledo. F. Supp. (Aug. 2. 1984). That Court said: 
"The fact that the procedure is an internal union procedure 
does not make it inherently unfair."— We note that in 
Hudson v. The Chicago Teachers Local. F2d (7th Circ, 
Sept. 6, 1984). the 7th Circuit found an internal union 
review procedure inherently inadequate without the 
availability of "a prompt administrative hearing before the 
Board of Education or some other state or local agency . . . 
." The possible dispute between the federal courts is not 
material here because, as we said in PEF (Raterman). 15 PERB 
1f3024 (1982). a nonmember need not exhaust the internal union 
review procedure before challenging a union determination in 
a plenary court action. 
Addressing the question of remedy. Barry argues that 
inasmuch as UUP's refund procedure does not satisfy §208.3 of 
the Taylor Law as we must reinterpret it to satisfy Ellis, a 
remedial order should be issued requiring UUP to refund all 
agency shop fees collected by it from all nonmembers for the 
1983-84 academic year. He further urges this Board to order 
•i/Accord Leemhuis v. Public Employee Federation. 17 PERB 
T7518 (Sup. Ct.. Sch. Co.. Sept. 10. 1984). 
- 9293 
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UUP to cease and desist from collecting any further agency 
shop fees until it has adopted an acceptable refund 
procedure. We reject these positions. 
UUP established its agency shop fee and refund procedure 
and maintained it in accordance with the standards prescribed 
by us in UUP (Eson). It could not reasonably be held to have 
anticipated the change in standards that we now determine are 
required by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ellis. 
Accordingly, any remedial order that we issue herein should 
be prospective in its application. This approach is similar 
to the one we followed in UUP (Eson). supra. There too we 
permitted UUP to continue to collect agency shop fees 
) provided that it would make appropriate changes in its refund 
procedure expeditiously. Further support for this approach 
may be found in recent federal court decisions. Champion v. 
State of California. F2d . (9th Circ, June 30. 1984) 
and Robinson v. State of New Jersey. F2d (3d Circ. 
August 2. 1984). These courts denied injunctive relief for 
alleged violations of the Ellis standard. In vacating an 
injunction that had been granted by the District Court, the 
3rd Circuit noted, with disapproval, that "the effect of the 
injunction relief has been to permit the free-rider problem 
which the Supreme Court addressed in Abood to manifest itself 
under the aegis of the injunction." 
We also reject Barry's argument that the remedial order 
should apply to all nonmembers. He asserts that the mere 
*• 9294 
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fact of nonmembership should be presumed to be a sufficient 
indication that the employee does not consent to UUP's 
expenditure of any part of his agency shop fee for political or 
ideological causes. We cannot make such a presumption. 
Moreover. §208.3 of the Taylor Law merely requires the refund of 
agency shop fee deductions to nonmembers who make a "demand", 
and it is only nonmembers entitled to a refund whose agency shop 
fees need be placed in escrow. This approach has been followed 
by the United States District Court in Tierney v. City of 
Toledo, supra. It also appears to satisfy constitutional 
requirements according to the 3rd Circuit. Robinson v. State of 
New Jersey, supra. That decision indicates that the obligation 
to place agency shop fees in escrow is "triggered by the filing 
of an objection letter with the union." 
UUP has not yet made any refund for the agency shop fees 
that it collected for the 1983-84 academic year. Indeed, the 
requests for such refunds are due during this month of September 
1984. UUP's procedure providing for a demand at the end of the 
academic year in which the fees were collected. We direct UUP 
to place the agency shop fees collected from Barry for 1983-84 
7/ 
in an interest-bearing escrow account immediately.— 
I/Compare UUP (Eson). 12 PERB V3117, affirmed UUP v. 
Newman. 80 AD2d 23 (3rd Dept. . 1981). 14 PERB ir7011. Mot Lv App 
Den 54 NY2d 611 (1981). 14 PERB T7026. There, as here, the 
remedy for UUP's misuse of agency shop fee monies was to make 
charging party whole and, with respect to other nonmembers. to 
require UUP to cease and desist from such misuse. 
Board - U-7449/U-7482 
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For the future. UUP must give nonmembers an opportunity 
to object to the use of their agency shop fees for political 
or ideological causes before commingling those fees with 
members' dues. Thus, current nonmembers should be given an 
immediate opportunity to object to such use of their 1984-85 
agency shop fees by filing a demand for a refund. The 
procedure adopted by UUP to afford nonmembers this 
opportunity should utilize the same manner of notice to the 
employees as it shall require of them to notify it of their 
demand for a refund. For current nonmembers, this process 
should be completed by October 31. 1984. Persons who become 
members of the negotiating unit represented by UUP after the 
date of this order who do not join that organization should 
be given an opportunity to object to the use of their agency 
shop fees for political or ideological causes before any 
agency shop fees are deducted from them. 
Starting November 7, 1984. 100% of all the agency shop 
fees collected from nonmembers who have demanded refunds 
should be deposited in an interest-bearing escrow account, 
the proceeds of which should be distributed in accordance 
with the procedure specified herein. 
Barry argues that UUP's refund procedure has been 
inadequate not only in that it has permitted UUP to borrow 
money to be used for political or ideological expenditures 
from objecting nonmembers. but also in that there is no 
„- 9296 
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adequate procedure to review UUP's determinations as to what 
expenses may be properly charged to objecting nonmembers. To 
the extent that Barry complains about the reliance upon 
internal UUP procedures, we have already rejected his 
argument. 
Going beyond that, Barry argues that this Board must 
afford him and other objecting nonmembers a forum in which to 
challenge the internal determinations made by UUP as well as 
those made by the neutral it appoints. He recognizes that we 
have already rejected this argument in Hampton Bays. 14 PERB 
1f30l8 (1981) and he urges us to overrule that decision. 
There is nothing in Ellis that is inconsistent with our 
determination in Hampton Bays that such challenges should be 
made in a plenary court action. We are also not pursuaded by 
Hudson or anything else in Barry's arguments or those of the 
Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, to overrule Hampton 
Bays. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER UUP to: 
1. Place the 1983-84 agency fee payments 
of Barry in an interest-bearing escrow 
account, such funds to be maintained 
therein until there is a final 
determination of the amount of the 
refund, at which time UUP may make a 
distribution of the escrow account in 
-- Q9Q7 
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accordance with such final 
determination; 
2. Submit to this Board, by October 26, 
1984. a revised refund procedure 
that is consistent with this 
decision; 
3. Cease and desist, on November 7, 
1984, from commingling agency shop 
fee payments from any nonmember 
with members' dues unless it has 
established a refund procedure 
consistent with this decision which 
has been approved by this Board 
prior to such date. 
In all other respects, we affirm the 
decision of the Director dismissing the 
charges. 
DATED: September 19. 1984 
Albany, New York 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
W^ 
David C. Handle 
_..Jr 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Mat ter of #2D-9/19/84 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK and 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS..'. , 
LOCAL 2, AFT, AFL-CIO. 
Respondent. 
-and- ._ . CASE NO. U-7323 
ROSELLA McCREADY. - . 
ChargingJParty. . 
ROSELLA McCREADY. pro se .; .. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed on February 15, 1984 by 
Rosella McCready. a paraprofessional employed by the Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
(District). It alleges that the District improperly 
transferred her on September 7. 1983 from P.S. 131 t6 P.S. 119 
in that she did not consent to the transfer and there were 
other paraprofessionals with less seniority than she who could 
have been given the assignment at P.S. 119. The charge also 
alleges that her union. United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, 
AFT. AFL-CIO (UFT) violated the duty of fair representation it 
owes her in that it refused to process her grievance 
complaining about the transfer, such refusal being improperly 
_ Q9QQ 
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motivated. McCready's papers show that the UFT chapter 
representative informed her on September 7 and September 8, 
1983, and confirmed in writing on September 22, 1983. that the 
grievance was without merit in that the relevant collective 
bargaining agreement does not provide for seniority-based 
transfers. 
The Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissed the charge on the ground 
that it is not timely.— The matter comes to us on 
McCready's exceptions to that decision. Acknowledging that the 
charge is not timely, she asks us to excuse i!ts lateness on the 
ground that she did not know the identity of the agency to 
which she might complain at the time of the violation. Her 
exceptions are accompanied by copies of correspondence showing 
that she had attempted to complain to other governmental 
agencies; however, that correspondence also shows that on 
November 28, 1983. the National Labor Relations Board wrote to 
her and identified this Board as the entity probably having 
jurisdiction over her complaint. 
I/Section 204.1(a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure provides: 
An original and four copies of a charge 
that any public employer or its agents, or 
any employee organization or its agents, 
has engaged in or is engaging in an 
improper practice may be filed with the 
Director within four months thereof by one 
or more public employees or any employee 
organization acting in their behalf, or by 
a public employer. 
3ST 
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We affirm the decision of the Director. The State 
Supreme Court has held that we may not disregard our rules 
and accept a petition which is not timely. Cattaraugus 
County Chapter of CSEA v. PERB. 3 PERB ir7005 (Sup. Ct. , Renss„ Co„, 
1970). If there be circumstances where we need not follow 
this ruling, it would not be in a case, such as this, where 
charging party was informed of the possible jurisdiction of 
this agency when she still had six weeks to file a timely 
charge. 
NOW, THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 19, 1984 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. RandlesV. Membe, 
\/i 
>XJ?_ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #3A-9/19/84 
VILLAGE OF TIVOLI. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2775 
NEW YORK STATE FEDERATION OF POLICE, 
INC. , 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New York State Federation of 
Police, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All police officers in the ranks 
of sergeant and patrolmen. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Certification - C-2775 page 2 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the New York State Federation 
of Police. Inc. and enter into a written agreement with such 
employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the above unit, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of. and administration of. grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: September 19, 1984 
Albany. New York 
-7^^2^£4^ rjtU*r-ZOL, 
Haro ld R. Newman, Chairman 
L;J<£-
David C. Rand r e s . Member 
